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A Defence White Paper attempts to resolve—in the public arena—the central ‘puzzle’ of 
Australian strategy. That puzzle requires us to define the relationship between three core 
variables: 
 
• a strategic environment largely beyond our own making 
• our own role in the world 
• and the constraints that bound that role. 
 
A White Paper is not merely a clever academic paper. It requires us to make judgments, 
including judgments about our own strategic future and about how we manage risks in an 
uncertain world. The plausibility of the arguments underpinning those judgments will in turn be 
assessed, by Australians and others. In the short run, the White Paper will be assessed 
against the metrics that determine academic grades: are the arguments convincing, are the 
central claims supported by reasons and are the reasons supported by evidence? In the longer 
run, of course, and with the benefit of hindsight, the paper will also be judged by outcomes: 
how astutely Australian strategic policy unfolds in a variety of real-world situations. 
 
Strategic complexities 
 
Telling the world how we see the strategic environment is itself a complex task. That 
environment defies easy portrayal. The thickening ties of globalisation are a potent indicator of 
global complexity. Moreover, the environment does not seem reducible to easy catchphrases 
of the sort we previously used to describe it. Cold War bipolarity has faded. Post-9/11, it has 
become harder to sustain the picture that some strategic analysts painted in the 1990s—the 
picture of a world divided between a ‘zone of peace’ and a ‘zone of war’. Power distributions 
are confusing: at the global level, we tend to talk of unipolarity, but at the regional level we 
often talk of multipolarity. The security agenda itself has become overloaded by the addition of 
a series of non-traditional security threats—everything from pandemics to human security 
issues to climate change—to the more traditional agenda based upon military threats to states. 
And global institutions (like the UN) look dated and unreformable, which means that each year 
that passes we are less able to solve the problems of the 21st century using the institutions of 
the mid-20th. 
 
Across the spectrum of all those challenges is one even deeper and more haunting: the 
prospect that the Westphalian system which has served as the basis of the international 
system since 1648 may itself be eroding. The peace of Westphalia was built upon the 
agreement that states were to be the sole wielders of military force. But there is nothing written 
in stone to say that the Westphalian system will be a permanent feature of the international 
landscape. States have an interest in preserving the system, and the stronger the state the 
greater that interest. This is evident in the new international commitment to nation-building. 
Still, even strong Western states are now seizing opportunities to partner with non-state actors 
in pursuit of strategic objectives: witness the cooperation between the United States military 
forces and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001, for example. A world where we 
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declare war on some non-state actors, and partner with others, is a world where those actors 
are rapidly becoming more strategically important. 
 
Harder 
 
In this more complex world, some actions are easier and some actions are harder. It has, for 
instance, become harder for nation-states to bring military force to bear on threats. Nowadays, 
we are often uncertain even about where the battlefield is. As Anna Simons, an academic at 
the US Naval Postgraduate School, has noted, conquest as a form of warfare might even be 
dead. Further, rapid military victories have become all but impossible in the forms of warfare 
that now predominate across the globe. Those are not trivial strategic issues: Western military 
forces—including Australia’s—are optimised for conquest and decisive battle.   
 
In the complex, globalised world it is harder, too, to set priorities on a geographic basis, and 
harder to solve security challenges that are essentially multidimensional. Perhaps most 
important of all, it is harder in that world to achieve desired outcomes by unilateral actions, 
even for the world’s strongest powers. If the United States finds it hard to prevail unilaterally, 
why should we think it would be easier for us? For Australia, which has often thought of its 
priorities in geographical terms and taken solace from its ability to be self-reliant in the defence 
of its own continent, those are unhelpful developments. 
 
Easier 
 
Conversely, it has become easier to move items across national borders, and to nurture 
linkages across those same borders. The world has become a network of globalised 
production chains for both industry and war, legal and illegal. The movement of fraudulent 
drugs, for example, draws heavily upon the world’s free trade zones, where government 
regulation is minimal. The world moves increasingly towards modular assembly and ‘just-in-
time’ solutions: as the authors of the Princeton Project on US National Security have noted, 
the business deal and the terrorist attack are conducted by groups that come together for only 
a short time, and which do not exist as standing entities. 
 
And, just as conquest has become harder, raiding has become easier. Raiding has existed for 
centuries as the alternative form of warfare, but our knowledge of it has been obscured by our 
own fascination for decisive battles. Those cultures—primarily non-Western cultures—that 
traditionally raided placed great emphasis not upon gaining and holding territory but upon the 
showmanship of the attack, or the plunder to be gained; 9/11 signals the return of raiding to 
the forefront of Western strategic concerns. 
 
Asia and the ‘near arc’ 
 
The complex global order is complemented by an Asian security order in flux. Strategic 
relativities are shifting in Asia as we witness the end of the post-WWII order of weakened 
Asian great powers. The regional great powers are all rising simultaneously, but with no history 
of security cooperation between them. In the long run, we might be witnessing the return of 
global leadership to Asia, but much more immediately we have to worry about the old security 
agenda of balance, deterrence and force modernisation. Fortunately, we have no reason to 
believe that the barriers to great-power conflict are any weaker in Asia than they are 
elsewhere. But we do have to beware our exposure to the possibly sharper strategic contests 
to our north: Australia has strong economic and strategic interests in Northeast Asia. 
 
We also face the problems of the ‘near-arc’; the problems of our own neighbourhood. On the 
whole, these are not world-shaping problems, but if Australia doesn’t help to fix them, who 
will? If nobody helps, the problems will fester; if someone else helps, we lose sway over our 
immediate region. The problems are the developmental challenges faced by both small, fragile 
microstates in the South Pacific and the larger, more populous countries to our immediate 
north. These problems generally require durable ground-force commitments rather than high-
technology military kit. They require the presence of a stabilising hand rather than a squadron 
of F/A-18s. 
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Australian options 
 
Australia can’t create the international security environment in which it lives, although it can do 
a limited amount to shape that environment. But it has considerably more scope to determine 
the second part of the puzzle: deciding its own role in relation to that broader setting. Possible 
roles can broadly be allocated along a spectrum that would include policies of restraint at one 
end, and policies of engagement at the other. 
 
At the ‘restraint’ end of the spectrum, we would: 
 
• define our security interests narrowly 
• use security instruments stingily 
• contribute to responsibilities and costs on an equitable basis 
• watch and wait more patiently. 
 
At the ‘engagement’ end of the spectrum, we would: 
 
• define our security interests broadly 
• use security instruments more generously 
• lead on responsibilities and costs 
• act more rapidly. 
 
Options at the engagement end of the spectrum tend to strengthen a country’s role as an 
environment shaper; options at the restraint end of the spectrum leave more of that shaping 
role in the hands of others. For middle powers, in particular, it is typical for strategic decisions 
to shift along that spectrum in relation to different issues. Such countries choose to be 
engaged on some issues, restrained on others. 
 
Australian ‘strategic personality’ 
 
The choice that Australia makes about its role in the world is shaped by a variety of factors. 
But on the whole, as a nation we have tended to prefer options drawn from the ‘engagement’ 
end of the spectrum. Those options seem to fit better with what we might call our ‘strategic 
personality’. If we were to apply here the model of strategic personality, devised by Caroline 
Ziemke of the Institute for Defence Analyses, then it might be possible to describe Australia as 
an Extroverted, Sensing, Thinking (EST) state. Under the Ziemke model, these terms describe 
respectively a nation’s orientation to the world, the information it pays most attention to, and 
the factors that dominate in its decision-making. 
 
As an Extroverted nation, Australia judges that its Ultimate Concerns can’t be satisfied at 
home. It sees its own growth and development as dependent upon interaction with other 
states, it takes a close interest in the international order, and it rejects strongly the idea that it 
might become stronger by cutting itself off from the outside world. As a Sensing nation, 
Australia pays attention to the sensory data of the world and doesn’t ‘intuit’ that world from a 
vision of its own divine mission. Sensing states tend to be pragmatic in policy formulation, and 
have little patience with theories, visions or hypothetical speculations. And as a Thinking 
nation, Australian policy-makers decide matters by rationality rather than by emotions and 
feelings. In Australian history the classic example of this preference was John Curtin’s 
‘Australia looks to America’ statement in 1941:   ‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it 
quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or 
kinship with the United Kingdom.’ 
 
As an EST nation, Australia stands in some contrast to the United States, an Extroverted, 
Intuitive, Feeling (ENF) nation under Ziemke’s model. (It also stands in contrast to the Asian 
great powers, where China ranks as an Introverted, Sensing, Thinking state, Japan as an 
Introverted, Sensing, Feeling state, and India as an Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking state. 
Extroverted states in Asia are few and far between.) And, of course, if the Extroverted, 
Sensing and Thinking genes are the dominant ones in Australia’s strategic personality, then 
introvertedness, intuition and sentimental decision-making are the recessive genes in the 
Australian strategic personality. 
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The problem of constraints 
 
Obviously, we can expect to encounter constraints in fulfilling our role of engagement in the 
world. Three in particular demand closer scrutiny:  
 
• how do we set priorities in a world of complex and interwoven threats? 
• how do we sustain ‘strategic solvency’ in such a world? 
• how do we build a force structure that has optimal strategic utility in such a world? 
 
The Defence White Paper will need to address those constraints to complete the story that it 
tells.  
 
Priority setting 
 
Setting clear priorities is the key filter for separating those security issues which demand some 
level of engagement from us, and those on which we can choose not to engage. Previous 
White Papers have generally attempted to set those priorities by application of a simple 
geographic construct, what we might call the ‘concentric circles’ model of priority-setting. 
(Those unfamiliar with the model can see it deployed in White Paper 2000, Chapter 4.) 
 
Unfortunately, the utility of setting priorities geographically declines in a globalised world—a 
world of increasing interconnectedness. Globalisation is essentially an enabling mechanism, 
which means that an increasing fraction of our security threats is likely to come from 
geographically distant regions. Already our security is threatened not merely by those 
traditional, distant, great-power contests (with which we have always felt a sense of 
engagement, regardless of the concentric circles model), but also by the much smaller war-
making units with global reach (the units that raid, rather than conquer). Westerners have often 
despised raiding as a strategy, and even now many commentators say that we needn’t take Al 
Qaeda as a serious strategic threat because it doesn’t pose an ‘existential threat’ (i.e. a threat 
of conquest) to Australia. That judgment understates the strategic effects that global raiding 
can have in an age of technological diffusion. An advanced Western country could tolerate one 
9/11, perhaps, but not many 9/11s, and especially not escalating 9/11s. 
 
Still, there is one area of concern where we should be prioritising locally. In the world of 
intervention, peacekeeping, stabilisation, and reconstruction, we should be working principally, 
perhaps even exclusively, in the near region. Why? Australia is virtually unique amongst 
Western countries in living amongst developing states. We don’t have the luxury of a typical 
Western European state, finding ourselves surrounded by other affluent, democratic, 
developed countries. Australians don’t have to travel far from home to find as many 
developmental challenges as they can sensibly manage. 
 
Strategic solvency 
 
All countries have to worry about strategic solvency. As Richard Armitage, former US Deputy 
Secretary of State, once noted, Australia is not a country of 100 million people and a big 
economy. It is a country of about 20 million people, and approximately the world’s 15th largest 
economy. So Australia can be a force for good in the world, but only in limited doses. 
Sometimes, even when we know there is an urgent need for someone to do good in the 
world—Darfur, for example—we will need to decline assistance. Sometimes, even when there 
are important conflicts that engage our interests far afield, we will have to calibrate carefully 
our engagement. 
 
The strategic solvency problem becomes sharper in a world without rapid victory. In a long 
war, sustainment becomes a key worry. And in a world of diffuse threats, it is critical to avoid 
threat conflation. Complexity is a genuine issue in the modern security environment. We have 
to recognise it, and not treat connected problems as unconnected. But we also need to beware 
endlessly conflating threats; it does us no good to conclude that everything is connected to 
everything else. The War on Terror is a good example of just how easy it is to conflate threats. 
 
Force qualities 
 
We face a strategic environment that pulls us in multiple directions. In the old interstate war 
model, small wars and big wars essentially fell as points along the same line: a small war was 
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just a big war in microcosm, as it were, and the difference was essentially one of scale. But 
increasingly, small wars look to be something of a different genre to big wars, less amenable 
to a strategy of decisive battle and technological advantage. The threat spectrum, we might 
say, has lost linearity; it has certainly lost scaleability. Increasingly, strategists are being pulled 
towards the idea that military forces must be capable of fighting ‘hybrid wars’. 
 
We cannot be confident that the old world of interstate war is dead, especially with the Asian 
strategic environment undergoing its current transformation. So we cannot be indifferent to the 
world of conquest, even in a world where such conquest is becoming harder. Tipping our hat 
to Napoleon, we need some forces that can play the game of traditional, interstate warfare. But 
here we are most in need of a sensible metric against which to develop our forces. Are we 
sizing our forces for independent, robust action against one of the regional great powers? Are 
we scaling our forces to the geographic constraints of the sea–air gap? Are we trying to build a 
force that can work alongside our major ally in the vast majority of conflicts where our mutual 
interests are engaged? Are we intending to do all of the above? This type of conflict will 
demand more than skilled infantry: it will require high-technology capabilities that could play a 
role in high-intensity combat. Still, we ought to be sizing this part of the force on the judgment 
that we will probably not be fighting alone against a regional great power. 
 
We must also have capabilities to counter—and perhaps to exploit—that part of the conflict 
spectrum that is becoming easier. In short, our Defence Forces should have some capacities 
to counter ‘raiding’. Essentially, that means countering the ‘global insurgents’, as David 
Kilcullen calls them. Most Western militaries were never very good at countering insurgency 
when it was limited to one country; now that it has escaped national boundaries, they all need 
to get a lot better at this sort of mission. Perhaps we should also consider whether the ADF 
needs more options to raid strategically on Australia’s behalf. After all, if we live in a world 
where raiding is easier, it is simply an efficiency to exercise such a use of force option 
ourselves. The unipolar power is still attempting conquest, and the small actors are already 
raiding: as a middle power, perhaps we ought to lean a little more towards the raiding end of 
the spectrum than the conquering end, in terms of our own use of force. 
 
And thirdly, we need the forces that can conduct the intervention and stabilisation missions 
that are now typical around the South Pacific. Those forces need good civil–military skills, and 
will typically be the low-technology, ‘presence’ forces characteristic of long-lasting, 
peacekeeping missions. Such missions usually occur in relatively benign, rather than relatively 
belligerent, security environments. Their skill-sets of deployed troops need to emphasise more 
of the disciplines of anthropology and the social sciences than of the harder-edged military 
virtues. At this lower end of the mission profile, Defence will usually be working with a range of 
civilian partners, and there might be scope for designing and building specific forces for these 
kinds of roles. At this end of the mission profile, too, the opportunities to mesh defence policy 
with a broader national security policy are greatest. 
 
Finally, it is increasingly likely that the ADF will be called out to perform some role in relation to 
domestic security—particularly in the wake of a major terrorist incident. The ADF must have 
some contribution it can provide to ‘aid the civil power’, although this will not be the primary 
focus of its existence.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Writing a good White Paper will be a challenging exercise. The strategic environment is 
complex, and we ignore that complexity at our peril. We have to avoid the temptation to pole 
vault over that complexity, in the hope that we can return somehow to a simpler, earlier age of 
interstate warfare. Moreover, the things that Western militaries have traditionally done well—
conquest and decisive battle—are becoming harder. So too, it is becoming harder to achieve 
outcomes unilaterally, a development that may be eroding Australia’s preferred policy of self-
reliant defence of the continent. 
 
Critically, the White Paper will have to outline Australia’s own role in the world. That means 
saying something about how we see our interests, how we intend to use our security 
instruments, how we approach issues of responsibilities and costs, and when we think action 
is appropriate. Australians will have a range of views on those questions, but the majority will 
probably still want to be strategically extroverted—‘engaged’—in this complex security 
environment. 
 
 6 
  
About the Author 
 
Dr Rod Lyon 
 
Dr Rod Lyon is ASPI’s Strategy and International Program Director. 
 
 
About Policy Analysis 
 
Generally written by ASPI experts, POLICY ANALYSIS is provided online to give readers 
timely, insightful opinion pieces on current strategic issues, with clear policy recommendations 
when appropriate. They reflect the personal views of the author and do not in any way express 
or reflect the views of the Australian Government or represent the formal position of ASPI on 
any particular issue. 
 
 
ASPI 
Tel + 61 2 6270 5100 
Fax + 61 2 6273 9566 
Email enquiries@aspi.org.au 
Web www.aspi.org.au 
 
 
© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2008  
This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, 
no part of it may in any form or by an means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying,  
photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or  
transmitted without prior written permission.  Enquiries should be addressed to the  
publishers. 
